The future of American soft power

CAMBRIDGE — Power is the ability to get others to do what you want. That can be accomplished by coercion (“sticks”), payment (“carrots”), and attraction (“honey”). The first two methods are forms of hard power, whereas attraction is soft power. Soft power grows out of a country’s culture, its political values, and its foreign policies. In the short term, hard power usually trumps soft power. But over the long term, soft power often prevails. Joseph Stalin once mockingly asked, “How many divisions does the Pope have?” But the papacy continues today, while Stalin’s Soviet Union is long gone.

When you are attractive, you can economize on carrots and sticks. If allies see you as benign and trustworthy, they are more likely to be open to persuasion and follow your lead. If they see you as an unreliable bully, they are more likely to drag their feet and reduce their interdependence when they can. Cold War Europe is a good example. A Norwegian historian described Europe as divided into a Soviet and an American empire. But there was a crucial difference: the American side was “an empire by invitation.” That became clear when the Soviets had to deploy troops to Budapest in 1956, and to Prague in 1968. In contrast, NATO has not only survived but voluntarily increased its membership.

A proper understanding of power must include both its hard and soft aspects. Machiavelli said it was better for a prince to be feared than to be loved. But it is best to be both. Because soft power is rarely sufficient by itself, and because its effects take longer to realize, political leaders are often tempted to resort to the hard power of coercion or payment. When wielded alone, however, hard power can involve higher costs than when it is combined with the soft power of attraction. The Berlin Wall did not succumb to an artillery barrage; it was felled by hammers and bulldozers wielded by people who had lost faith in Communism and were drawn to Western values.

After World War II, the United States was by far the most powerful country, and it attempted to enshrine its values in what became known as “the liberal international order” – a framework comprising the United Nations, the Bretton Woods economic institutions, and other multilateral bodies. Of course, the US did not always live up to its liberal values, and Cold War bipolarity limited this order to only half the world’s people. But the postwar system would have looked very different if the Axis powers had won WWII and imposed their values.

While prior US presidents have violated aspects of the liberal order, Donald Trump is the first to reject the idea that soft power has any value in foreign policy. Among his first actions upon returning to office was to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization, despite the obvious threats that climate change and pandemics pose.

The effects of a US administration surrendering soft power are all too predictable. Coercing democratic allies like Denmark or Canada weakens trust in our alliances. Threatening Panama reawakens fears of imperialism throughout Latin America. Crippling the US Agency for International Development (USAID) – created by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 – undercuts our reputation for benevolence. Silencing Voice of America is a gift to authoritarian rivals. Slapping tariffs on friends makes us appear unreliable. Trying to chill free speech at home undermines our credibility. This list could go on.

Trump has defined China as America’s great challenge, and China itself has been investing in soft power since 2007, when then-Chinese President Hu Jintao told the Communist Party of China that the country needs to make itself more attractive to others. But China has long faced two major obstacles in this respect. First, it maintains territorial disputes with multiple neighbors. Second, the CPC insists on maintaining tight control over civil society. The costs of such policies have been confirmed by public opinion polls that ask people around the world which countries they find attractive. But one can only wonder what these surveys will show in future years if Trump keeps undercutting American soft power.

To be sure, American soft power has had its ups and downs over the years. The US was unpopular in many countries during the Vietnam and Iraq wars. But soft power derives from a country’s society and culture as well as from government actions. Even during the Vietnam War, when crowds marched through streets around the world to protest US policies, they sang the American civil-rights anthem “We Shall Overcome.” An open society that allows protest can be a soft-power asset. But will America’s cultural soft power survive a downturn in the government’s soft power over the next four years?

American democracy is likely to survive four years of Trump. The country has a resilient political culture and a federal constitution that encourages checks and balances. There is a reasonable chance that Democrats will regain control of the House of Representatives in the 2026 elections. Moreover, civil society remains strong, and the courts independent. Many organizations have launched lawsuits to challenge Trump’s actions, and markets have signaled dissatisfaction with Trump’s economic policies.

American soft power recovered after low points in the Vietnam and Iraq wars, as well as from a dip in Trump’s first term. But once trust is lost, it is not easily restored. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia lost most of what soft power it had, but China is striving to fill any gaps that Trump creates. The way Chinese President Xi Jinping tells it, the East is rising over the West. If Trump thinks he can compete with China while weakening trust among American allies, asserting imperial aspirations, destroying USAID, silencing Voice of America, challenging laws at home, and withdrawing from UN agencies, he is likely to fail. Restoring what he has destroyed will not be impossible, but it will be costly.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., was Dean of Harvard Kennedy School, a US assistant secretary of defense, and the author of Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump (Oxford University Press, 2020) and the memoir A Life in the American Century (Polity Press, 2024). Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2025. www.project-syndicate.org