‘A mere matter of survival’

Despite its success in checking Israeli military advances in Gaza, Hamas’ regional political manoeuvres of recent years are not bearing fruit.

Isolated by Israel and Arab parties, unaided by the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas, the Islamic Resistance Movement is once again facing difficult choices, and it seems to be choosing a cautious return to its old camp of Iran and Hizbollah.

The manoeuvre this time is particularly risky, but other options are too limited or simply do not exist.

The movement is facing formidable challenges: a mired economy, ruined infrastructure, destroyed Rafah tunnels and a persisting Israeli siege.

The progress of the Hamas-Fateh agreement last year, followed by the formation of a new government, was meant to be a prerequisite to other anticipated moves, including the reformation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).

The once promising push for unity was interrupted by Israel’s massive war, the so-called Operation Protective Edge, which killed and wounded thousands. The war also left the already distraught Gaza in a worse shape.

Instead of speedily setting up government ministries in Gaza, funnelling money into the devastated strip and beginning the reconstruction process right away, the Ramallah-based government of Rami Hamdallah delayed everything in what could only be understood as political reasoning.

Without an outlet, however restricted, Gaza will not be able to cope for much longer.

Hamas’ attempt at engaging Egypt as a way of finding an alternative space to break the siege has not achieved results either. Egypt declared Hamas a terrorist organisation last March. More recently, Hamas’ military wing, Izzeddine Al Qassem Brigades found itself banned and accused of terrorism by an Egyptian court.

With the tunnels destroyed, and a buffer zone being established and fortified around the Gaza Strip from the Egyptian side of the border, the siege is now complete.

Yet Gaza could have survived, except that the Israeli war has left behind thousands of homeless families, over 11,000 wounded and entrenched in poverty.

A donors’ conference in Cairo last year pledged to rebuild Gaza, but few delivered. The United Nations and the Arab League are back appealing for aid promises to be met. But even if they are, the US and its allies insist that the money be not channelled through Hamas.

So, what is Hamas to do? 

Prior to so-called Arab Spring, which stated in 2011, the region was divided into two political camps: one known as the “axis of resistance”, also named the “rejectionist” camp, consisting of Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas, and the other, the camp of “moderates” which pools US regional allies.

The latter was positioned to offset the former.

The Sunni-Shiite divide existed then, but was hardly as pronounced as it is today.

The presence of Hamas, a Sunni organisation within a largely Shiite group and the clear demarcation of the fight that is between the US-Israel vs. the “axis of resistance” made any sectarian difference insignificant.

The Arab Spring brought ample promise before it dealt the entire region a massive blow. It wrought war and other bloody conflicts, but also unprecedented political and sectarian polarisation.

A war in Syria seemed like a best-case scenario for various Western powers, including the US, and Israel. Iran, Russia and Arab countries jumped into the fray, each with a different set of objectives.

For Iran, war arguably became an opportunity to extend its regional influence. With Hizbollah joining the fighting — which by then included numerous groups, both homegrown and foreign — the Sunni-Shiite aspect of the conflict became palpable.

Neither side would have allowed Hamas to operate outside the ugly sectarian paradigm anyway. The group was expected to take sides, and quickly.

Meanwhile, Palestinians remained disunited even when their unity mattered most. Abbas’ PA remained engaged in an inane “peace process” discourse, paying little attention to the thousands of dead and starving Palestinian refugees in Syria.

Hamas’ gamble failed to pay off. Further impoverished and isolated, Hamas sought respite by joining forces with Abbas’ Fateh, to end division and seek an outlet from what became a hopeless paradigm.

Then, Israel attacked Gaza. The media discussion was centred on Hamas’ unproven connection to the kidnapping and killing of three teenage Israeli settlers. That was barely the story.

With Hamas’ departure from the “axis of resistance” and its isolation by the “moderate” Arab camp, the movement was at its weakest.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu found an opportunity to deliver a final blow to Hamas as he hit Gaza with unmatched brutality. He intended to break Hamas politically before degrading its military capabilities.

The massive destruction of the Gaza infrastructure was not Israel’s everyday callousness in its treatment of Palestinians. It was meant to ensure that Hamas will have no chance to govern Gaza after the war, and simply collapse under the impossible task to rebuild the strip, with no aid, no cement and no material lifeline whatsoever.

The Arabs were either consumed with their own problems or watched Gaza’s severe punishment by Israel with a mix of dread, amusement and anticipation.

Those who urged Hamas to part ways with Iran failed to move forward and fill the existing gap of weapons, money and other material aid. Not only did many in Hamas see that as a betrayal, others who never sought a break up with Iran began pushing the movement to reconsider its political alliances once more.

In fact, the process of mending ties with Iran has been in the making for months, and many, however imprecise, signs of some kind of rapprochement between Iran and Hizbollah, on the one hand, and Hamas, on the other, had been adding up towards a foreseeable conclusion.

When an Israeli helicopter gunship hit a car convoy in the Syrian province of Quneitra on January 18, killing six Hizbollah fighters alongside an Iranian commander, Hamas was quick to offer condolences.

The most notable of these messages came from Mohammed Al Deif, the leader of the Al Qassem Brigades. Deif called for the directing of rifles in a joint battle against Israel.

Political messages also poured in, one from former Hamas government prime minister Ismail Haniyeh.

“We declare our full solidarity with Lebanon and the Lebanese resistance,” he said, calling for unity against the “principal enemy of the ummah”.

This, in addition to Hamas’ leader, Khaled Mishaal’s call for peaceful resistance in Syria, indicating that the Hamas search for a return to the Iranian camp was a matter of time. 

That return will happen sooner rather than later, as suggested by Ahmed Yousef, Haniyeh’s former top adviser and an influential member in the movement, who said that Mishaal should be heading to Tehran soon to meet with top Iranian leaders.

Hamas’ possible return to the Iranian camp is likely to be cautious, calculated and possibly costly. There is a crisis of trust among all parties. For some in Hamas, however, that return was inevitable.

But Iran and Hizbollah also need Hamas, at least to break away from the dominant sectarian narrative that has embroiled the region.

Iran’s and Hizbollah’s image, the latter once seen as the bulwark of resistance, is at an all-time low.

Some will chastise Hamas’ new strategy, others will praise its return to common sense. But for Hamas and Palestinian resistance in Gaza, it is a mere matter of survival.

The writer, www.ramzybaroud.net, is an internationally syndicated columnist, a media consultant, author of several books and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story” (Pluto Press, London). He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.