Iran, like the rest, is not blameless

When the United States government declared war on Afghanistan in October 2001, thus taking the first step in its so-called “war on terror”, following the devastating attacks of September 11 earlier that year, Iran jumped on board.

Then Iranian president Mohammed Khatami, dubbed a reformist, provided substantial assistance to the US effort aimed at defeating the Taliban, an ardent enemy of Iran and Afghan Shiites.

Indeed, the Taliban’s aggressive policies included an anti-Shiite drive that resulted in a massive refugee problem. Tens of thousands of Afghan Shiite sought refuge in Iran.

Khatami’s “friendly” gesture towards the anti-terror crusade lead by George W. Bush was by no means an Iranian departure from a supposed policy of non-intervention in the region.

Iran is a country with porous borders, political and strategic interests, serious and legitimate fears, but also unquestionable ambitions.

Iran’s intervention in Afghanistan has never ceased since then, and is likely to continue, especially following the US withdrawal, whenever it takes place.

Iran’s earlier role in Afghanistan ranged from the arrest of Al Qaeda suspects sought by Washington to training Afghan soldiers and direct intervention in the country’s politics so as to ensure that Afghanistan’s politics are aligned to meet Iranian expectations.

None of this should come as a surprise. Iran has been under massive scrutiny since the Iranian revolution in 1979. It has been threatened, sanctioned, punished and for nearly a decade fought a massive war with Iraq.

Nearly half-a-million soldiers and an estimated equal number of civilians perished in the “long war” when Iraq and Iran, using World War II tactics, sparred over territories, waterways access, resources, regional dominance and more.

Both parties used conventional and non-conventional weapons to win the ugly conflict. Neither did. 

But regardless of the thinking behind Iran’s current regional ambitions, one cannot pretend that Iran is an innocent force in the Middle East, solely aimed at self-preservation.

Such reading would be as incorrect as that championed by Israel and its remaining neoconservative friends in Washington who see Iran as a threat that must be eradicated for the Middle East to achieve peace and stability.

When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, Iran immediately moved to rearrange the country’s politics to suit its interests. It poured massive funds and a limitless arsenal to aid its allies, Shiite political parties and notorious militias.

Expectedly, Iran wanted to ensure that the American debacle in Iraq deepens, so Tehran does not become the next US war destination. To do so, however, Iran, jointly although indirectly with the Americans, savaged the once strongest Arab country.

The Shiite government and its numerous militias killed, butchered, abused and humiliated Sunnis, especially tribes, which were seen as particularity influential following the destruction of the Baath regime and other supposed centres of Sunni seats of power.

That reductionist understanding of Iraqi society was championed by both Washington and Tehran. The horrible consequences of that understanding raised unprecedented animosity towards Iran and, expectedly, towards Shiites in general throughout much of the region.

However, the key role played by Hizbollah, a mainly Lebanese Shiite party and fighting force, in ending the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 2000 and driving the Israelis out once more in 2006, balanced out the damage inflicted by Iran’s destructive role in Iraq.

Hizbollah’s ability to keep Israel at bay was more than enough to challenge the sectarian argument.

Things changed, however, with the arrival of the so-called Arab Spring. Iran and its regional enemies, in the Gulf and, later, in Turkey, perceived the upheaval in the Arab world as a serious threat, but also as an opportunity.

It was a great game par excellence, which is now on full display in Yemen, Syria and elsewhere.

While one may argue that ultimately the ongoing wars in the Middle East are not rooted in any sectarian tendencies, the outcome of a political power play that spans decades, there is no denial that the sectarian component of the war is now a defining factor and that Iran, like the Gulf, Turkey, Israel, the US and their Western allies, are all implicated. 

They may all claim some rational dialectic through which to justify or explain their involvement, but few can claim innocence in the suffering of millions of people.

During the Iraq-Iran war (1980-88), the US stood on Iraq’s side, providing logistical and military support. Iran does not trust the US, nor does it respect its foreign policy. But Tehran also understands that the US, despite its waning influence, will remain an important party in the Middle East, and therefore has tailored its policies with that understanding in mind.

Iran cooperates with the US when its suits its interests, as it did in Afghanistan, Iraq and now against Daesh.

From Tehran’s viewpoint, its regional expansion can be partly seen as a defence mechanism: a powerful and influential Iran would decrease the chances of a US-Israeli aggression.

Just recently, the European Union top diplomat called on Iran to “play a major, major but positive, role on Syria in particular, to encourage the regime to... [support] a Syrian-led transition”.

For Iran, such statements are political leverage that, to a degree, indicate the success of its strategy in Syria, one that involved major military support for Bashar Assad’s government and direct military intervention.

It is irrefutable that Iran’s role in Syria has been following the same sectarian lines that it followed and continues to adhere to in Iraq.

While Iran’s role in the fight against the Daesh brutes is undeniable, Iran’s responsibility in the rise of Sunni militarism in the first place must not be denied either.

While Iran is sustaining several fronts in its current role in the Middle East great game, it hopes to translate its palpable regional ascendancy into political capital by reaching a final nuclear deal before June 30.

That deal could spare Iran further conflict with the West, or at least lessen the fervour of war championed by rightwing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies.

Current media and political discourses attempting to reason the multiple conflicts in the Middle East region tend to invest in one singular reading, which demonises one party and completely spares others.

While the role of regional actors in supporting extremists in Syria and Iraq, which led to the formation of Daesh, is known and openly discussed, Iran cannot be spared the blame.

Iran is part and parcel of ongoing conflicts, has contributed to some, reacted to others; it laboured to defeat US ambitions, but also cooperated with Washington when their interests intersected. It is as sectarian as the rest, and abashedly so.

This is not an attempt at implicating Iran, but an honest reading into a war involving many parties whose hands are equally bloody.

The writer, ramzybaroud.net, has been writing about the Middle East for over 20 years. He is an internationally syndicated columnist, a media consultant, author of several books and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story” (Pluto Press, London). He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.