A general’s odd war

“Opportunistic” is a fitting description for Libya’s rogue General Khalifa Haftar who, for the second time in less than four months, mounted a coup against Tripoli.

Haftar’s opportunism has accompanied the man for the last 45 years; at 71, he is now determined to harness the security chaos in Libya to his advantage.

On May 16, Haftar staged several bloody attacks against other Libyan militias, claiming to eradicate terrorism, by leading a paramilitary force deceptively named the Libyan National Army.

His well-equipped brigades were rapidly joined by officers from national army bases in the eastern parts of the country. Units from the air force also joined in, along with tribal gunmen and other militias, particularly the strong and notorious Zintan militia.

The well-coordinated attacks, named Operation Karama, or Dignity, resulted in heavy casualties.

Then, with unprecedented audacity, he struck the parliament, sending Libyan lawmakers from the General National Council (GNC) fleeing for their lives.

Among his demands: the dismissal of the parliament and for the judiciary to take control of the country’s affairs until the next elections, scheduled for June 25.

The man is allegedly a proponent of a democratically elected civilian government, a contradiction that is becoming quite common in post-Arab Spring Middle East.

During the attack on the parliament and the seizure of government buildings, Haftar’s forces were backed by warplanes and helicopters. The show of force was massive, even for post-rebellion and NATO-led war on Libya, where guns are available in abundance.

Haftar is not a rogue general acting alone. He is supported by former Libyan prime minister Ali Zeidan and has strong, rich Libyan and Arab backers.

His long history of relations with the CIA is neither “misleading” nor “old news” as suggested by a recent article in the British Guardian.

Haftar is supposedly out to crush the Islamists, but the problem is that Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood is hardly the dominant political force in that country.

Haftar knows well that Islamic-leaning parties in Libya are not all the same. Yet, he seemed keen to emphasise the Brotherhood as a target of his ongoing war.

He told Al Sharq Al Awsat newspaper, in an interview published in May, that he intends to “purge” Libya of Muslim Brotherhood members who are a “malignant disease that is seeking to spread throughout the bones of the Arab world”.

He even formed a Libyan counterpart of Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

The Libyans are not always Haftar’s target audience; listening to his language, one is meant to understand that his problem is the security chaos that has afflicted the country due to the warring militias, following the NATO-backed victory over Muammar Qadhafi, but in fact, Haftar himself is leading some of these militias.

Washington is yet to condemn Haftar’s actions.

Its silence is reminiscent of the time Haftar attempted to stage the first coup, last February, and failed.

Then, in a televised speech, Haftar denounced the government and announced his “initiative”, a roadmap of sorts that saw the disbanding of parliament.

Few took him seriously and top government officials mocked his coup attempt. One described it as “ridiculous”. But then, many discovered the name Haftar and some became keenly interested to learn more.

Ashour Shamis is a former partner of Haftar’s. The two were members of the US-funded Libyan National Army in the 1980s. In a recent interview with the Guardian, he remarked: “I don’t think something like this can happen in Libya and the Americans would not know about it.”

According to Shamis, the Americans “want to see how much momentum Haftar has and how far he goes”.

Indeed, Haftar is doing a great deal to get Washington’s attention, which has somewhat diverted from Libya since the killing of its ambassador there and three others in September 2012.

To win favour with Washington, Haftar’s list of enemies also includes Ansar Al Sharia, which, along with other militias in Benghazi, was accused of plotting the attack against the US embassy.

But it shouldn’t be too difficult for Haftar to gain Washington’s trust. In fact, he already has.

It is no secret that Haftar has had strong backing from the US Central Intelligence Agency for nearly three decades.

The man has been branded and rebranded throughout his colourful and sometimes mysterious history.

He fought as an officer in the Chadian-Libyan conflict, and was captured alongside his entire unit of 600 men. During his time in prison, Chad experienced a regime change (both regimes were backed by French and US intelligence) and Haftar and his men were released per US request and moved to another African country.

While some chose to return home, others knew well what would await them in Libya, for reasons explained by the New York Times on May 17, 1991: “For two years, United States officials have been shopping around for a home for about 350 Libyan soldiers who cannot return to their country because American intelligence officials had mobilised them into a commando force to overthrow Col. Muammar Qadhafi, the Libyan leader,” NYT reported.

“Now, the administration has given up trying to find another country that will accept the Libyans and has decided to bring them to the United States.”

Haftar was relocated to a Virginia suburb in the early 1990s, where he settled very close to the CIA headquarters in Langley. The news about his exact activities living near Washington, DC, is murky, except for his ties to Libyan opposition forces, which of course operated according to US diktat.

It took nearly 15 years for Haftar to march on Libya. It also took a massive war that was purported to support a popular uprising. It is no wonder Haftar’s return to Libya in March 2011 was a major source of controversy.

Almost immediately, he was announced by a military spokesman as the rebels’ new commander, only for the announcement to be dismissed by the National Transitional Council as false.

The NTC was largely a grouping of equally enigmatic characters that had little presence in Libya’s national consciousness.

Haftar found himself as the third man on the military ladder, which he grudgingly accepted.

Libya is now subjected to punishing violence and is hostage to the whims of militias, some tribal, others affiliated with small towns and large cities — Misrata, Zintan and so on — yet others loosely affiliated with government ministries.

In times of such befuddling strife, some people might be ready to accept feeble alternatives. Despite his dubious legacy, Haftar might appear to some as Libya’s “strong man”.

Still, few are convinced.

Powerful militias are also lining up against Haftar. Misrata’s 235-militia brigades are ready to fight. They have already deployed near Tripoli.

If this showdown is allowed to carry on, another bloody civil war will be awaiting Libya. This time around, however, neither NATO nor the US seem willing to get involved again, at least not until one warring camp proves worthy of their support.

In all cases, Libya’s suffering is likely to linger.

The writer, managing editor of Middle East Eye, is an internationally syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is “My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story” (Pluto Press, London). He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.