Iraq and Syria — ‘gone’ countries

An Iraqi friend I met in London over dinner remarked: “My country is gone, finished… and Syria is gone as well.”

The toxic combination of Bush wars, terrible policies adopted by the international community and the rise of radical fundamentalism have doomed these two countries, the font of ancient, mediaeval, Islamic and Arab civilisation.

She observed that she and her daughter had paid a bribe of $1,000 to obtain their Iraqi identity cards.

“You cannot do anything without paying,” she said.

Baghdad is a dangerous place due to bombers, kidnappers and other criminals.

“Now the Americans are concentrating on Kobani,” the Syrian Kurdish town under threat from the Islamic State (Daesh) while “Daesh is at the gates of Baghdad.”

Corruption, violence and Daesh are all elements of the legacy bequeathed to Iraq by former prime minister Nouri Al Maliki, chosen by the US to lead Iraq’s government in 2006.

Although Maliki is no longer premier, he remains a major player on the Iraqi political scene.

His successor, Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi, remains tied to US and Maliki policies: Shiite dominance in governance and the security forces, Tehran’s powerful role in decision making, and marginalisation of Sunnis and Kurds.

Because of the dominance of Shiite fundamentalists who rode into Baghdad on the backs of US tanks in 2003 and Maliki’s efforts to deepen this dominance, Abadi was compelled to wheel and deal amongst competing Shiite factions when choosing his Cabinet.

His appointment of Muhammad Salem Al Ghabban as interior minister was a case in point.

This took weeks of negotiation. Ghabban belongs to the Badr Organisation, a Shiite political faction tied to Iran. Its military wing, the Badr Brigade, has been accused by Sunnis of committing massacres during the height of post-US war violence in 2006-2008.

Ghabban was chosen when Sunnis angrily rejected the selection of the head of the brigade, Hadi Al Ameri, for this post that controls the internal security forces and the police.

Abadi was supposed to be creating an “inclusive” Cabinet rather than one that would perpetuate fundamentalist Shiite dominance at the expense of Sunnis, Kurds, Christians and secularists.

During his years as premier, Maliki not only assumed the role of commander in chief of the country’s security forces and army, he also appointed officers loyal to him or officers who paid to secure certain posts.

Sums were fixed for a general’s rank, a colonel’s rank, and so on.

To raise the funds to pay for the positions, officers exaggerated the number of soldiers in units under their control and pocketed the salaries of “ghost soldiers”.

Troop strength was diminished. Officers lived comfortably, soldiers suffered privation, poor training and shortage of weapons.

Therefore, when Daesh turned up on the approaches to the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, on June 10, the officers fled to the Kurdish autonomous region and men took off their uniforms, abandoned their weapons and vehicles, and scattered.

Maliki also packed the administration with loyalists that Abadi cannot remove and replace with competent appointees capable of enacting reform and building the country.

Many of Maliki’s appointees are interested only in enriching themselves. The fate of Iraq is not a concern.

If challenged by Abadi, Maliki’s men can undermine his efforts to govern.

While Maliki has been appointed vice president, a largely ceremonial position, he continues to exercise power through the State of Law electoral coalition and the fundamentalist Dawa Party, both of which he heads.

As a junior figure in the Dawa Party, Abadi remains in Maliki’s shadow and dependent on Maliki for political legitimacy, which Maliki is withholding.

To ensure his grip on power before being compelled to cede the top job, Maliki named a new chief of army staff, a central bank governor and a secretary of the new Cabinet office, all key posts.

Maliki left office without securing parliamentary approval of the budget for 2014-15 and bequeathed Abadi a treasury without funds.

During Maliki’s eight years in office, human rights abuses abounded.

Dissidents and innocent people were arrested, held without trial, tortured and killed. Freedom of expression and peaceful assembly were denied.

Thousands of Sunnis who protested marginalisation were jailed.

Maliki refused to reach a deal with the Kurds over the sharing of revenues from oil extracted and exported from the Kurdish autonomous region, prompting the Kurds to pump their oil and sell it independently, and threaten to proclaim independence.

By ruling Iraq as a Shiite fundamentalist and taking power into his own hands, permitting and promoting corruption at all levels of the administration and armed forces, Maliki created the conditions for the rise of Daesh and the threat it poses to the entire region today.

Abadi has attempted to make changes in the military high command by dismissing inept and corrupt officers, but because he is fighting a war against Daesh while battling Maliki’s legacy, Abadi has to go slowly, cautiously, with the aim of keeping some order in the military and cultivating a fighting spirit which has been sorely lacking.

Washington airily speaks of retraining the army, but Iraq has no time to embark on such a major effort.

The US spent eight years trying to build a new Iraqi army after destroying the military machine established by the British in the 1930s and honed as a fighting force during the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-88.

The US cannot expect to achieve a major overhaul of the Iraqi army in eight days, eight weeks or eight months after failing to accomplish this end in eight years.