Iran talks — ‘failure cannot be contemplated’

A showdown between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany could come in a month’s time when the basics of a deal over Tehran’s nuclear programme are due to be agreed. Once this happens, scientists and technicians are set to hammer out the details by the end of June.

The stakes are high and the dangers are many. Success would remove any imminent threat of Iran’s manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The US and its partners insist that the lead time for an Iranian “breakout” should be one year. This means that if Tehran decides to go for weapons, Iran would need a year before it would have the material or means to manufacture one or more nuclear bombs.

Stringent monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be imposed on Iran’s programme to ensure that Iran could not cheat, assuring the international community that Iran was complying with the terms of the deal.

Success would also involve the lifting of sanctions on Iran, permitting it to sell its oil to traditional customers.

Some $100 billion in funds frozen in foreign banks would have to be released and the ban on bank transactions ended. International firms eager to rebuild Iran’s decrepit oil sector infrastructure would be permitted to secure contracts while other firms would be in a position to replace Iran’s ageing commercial airliners and other essential equipment denied under the harsh sanctions regime.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani contends the negotiations are a “win-win” proposition.

For Iran, failure is not really an option.  Iran’s economy has been hit hard by sanctions and the prolonged slump in oil prices.  The modest reforms he introduced could come to naught if there is no deal. 

This year, Iran is likely to earn $20-25 billion from oil sales, less than a quarter of the amount received in 2011 when the price soared.  Next year, earnings could be lower if the price remains at present levels or falls. 

Unemployment is rising and some public servants have not been paid in months. Many Iranians have to work two or three jobs to survive. 

Officials claim the situation will improve due to recent gains wrought by the “resistance economy” designed to diversify Iran’s output and reduce food, medical and industrial imports from the West. But the transformation would receive a healthy boost if and when a deal is reached; the release of Iran’s frozen billions and an end to curbs on Iranian oil exports could stimulate investment until oil prices rise. 

For the US and its Western allies success could also bring normalisation of relations with Iran for the first time since the 1979 Iranian revolution.

On the military front, the US-led anti-Daesh coalition operating in the air over Iraq and Syria could overtly cooperate and coordinate with Iranian forces on the ground playing a key role in the battle against Daesh. 

On the political plane, Shiite Iran might be more inclined than now to curb its regional ambitions. For instance, Iran could put serious pressure on the Shiite fundamentalist regime in Iraq to adopt an “inclusive” policy towards Sunnis and curb Shiite militias that have persecuted and cleansed Sunnis while battling Daesh.

Such changes could reassure Sunni powers that Iran is not trying to exploit current turmoil to establish regional hegemony.

On the economic level, Western and regional firms could benefit from investment in and trade with Iran. 

Nevertheless, US congressional Republicans and friends of Israel can be expected to make lifting sanctions as difficult as possible although, for Iran, the speed of this process will be considered a test of the intentions of Washington and its allies.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has so far backed the negotiations, has said he would “consent to an agreement that is workable”, but he also demanded a prompt end to sanctions.

US President Barack Obama can only deliver partial relief, however, because Congress has to legislate on this issue and the Republican majority would like to scupper an agreement by refusing to honour or dragging out implementation of the US-Western power’s side of the bargain.

If this were to happen, Washington’s European allies and other members of the international community could break with the US to ease, as much as possible, UN and bilateral sanctions and resume business dealings with Iran.

Non-US firms would win lucrative Iranian contracts while excluded US firms would be likely to put pressure on Congress to stop being obstructive.

Failure cannot be contemplated.

If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secures a third term in the parliamentary election on March 17, he could go on the warpath and mount air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, dragging the reluctant US into a major regional war.

Even the anti-Netanyahu Obama administration would be compelled to use its military might to pre-empt expected Iranian retaliation against Israel, as well as strikes on US bases and naval vessels in the Gulf.

This would mean US attacks on Iran’s airfields, army bases and naval facilities, as well as on the nuclear plant.

Iran could respond by encouraging dissident Shiites in the region to strike at oil fields and refineries, ports and airports in Sunni-majority countries.

The flow of oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to Western Europe and the East could be disrupted for some time. The oil price would soar, hitting the economically troubled West.

The Gulf as a transit hub between Europe and the East would be finished and the economies of Gulf states hit hard.

The increasingly desperate struggle against the ever-expanding Daesh would he seriously harmed without coordination between the coalition and Iran.

Nevertheless, failure is preferred by Netanyahu, right-wing Republicans in the US Congress, hardliners in the Iranian parliament and Revolutionary Guard.

Having staged his devastating war on Gaza, Netanyahu seems to be determined to hit Iran, whatever the consequences for Israel, the region and the Western powers.

The US, in particular, would be blamed for failing or refusing to restrain Israel. The likely Iranian backlash would not only turn Sunnis against Tehran, but would also deepen their hostility towards Israel, which would, rightly, be seen as the instigator of a new conflict in a region already beset by multiple, apparently endless, conflicts.