The complex Syrian situation and the Geneva talks

Sitting in the press centre at UN headquarters in Geneva, speaking to colleagues and nabbing a delegate to the Syrian “peace” talks should show journalists that this, the fourth round, is not “same old, same old”.

Yes, there are the “same old” sides: the government and the “old” expatriate opposition confronting one another.

They tick to the “same old” policies: the government says Syrian President Bashar Assad must stay on while the ”old” opposition calls for him to stand down.

These are the common denominators of all four sessions of talks, which began in 2014 with a ceremonial opening in the Swiss resort town of Montreux before moving to Geneva.

Although UN mediator Staffan de Mistura has been in the job since July 2014, succeeding Lakhdar Brahimi who moderated the first session, his mandate has evolved from strict adherence to the Geneva communiqué of June 2012 to Security Council Resolution 2254 of December 2015, which adopted a more flexible line on Assad’s fate.

This resolution called upon de Mistura to promote the formation of a transitional government that would write a new constitution and hold elections, according to the formula of the Geneva communiqué, but also called on him to invite new negotiators on the opposition side who would make representation “inclusive”.

This meant the opposition delegation would not be drawn solely from the Saudi-sponsored High Negotiations Committee (HNC), an arm of the Syrian National Coalition supported by the West and some Arab countries.

During this round, de Mistura invited five delegates each from the Moscow and Cairo platforms to participate in the negotiations and pressed these groups and the HNC to form a single delegation.

The HNC attempted to preempt the invitations by announcing that its 20-member delegation would contain one person from each platform.

Both refused to be drafted and continue to resist inclusion in an HNC-dominated delegation.

After a great deal of discussion with the powers-that-be, de Mistura issued independent invitations to the Moscow and Cairo platforms.

He also invited their five-member teams to the “welcoming ceremony” on February 24.

The furious HNC balked. The ceremony was delayed by nearly an hour while the government delegation sat patiently on the left side of the stage and de Mistura worked out what to do about the empty opposition seats on the right.

When the ceremony began, the HNC delegates were seated at a long table while the Moscow and Cairo platforms had two small separate tables alongside the HNC’s accommodation: placement was resolved.

Since then, de Mistura and Russia have exerted pressure on the three groups to form a “joint”, but not a unified delegation reflecting the views of all members.

While the HNC continues to hold to its oust-Assad stand, the Moscow and Cairo platforms back democratic reforms and administrative decentralisation: “evolution rather than revolution”, Jihad Makdissi, head of the Cairo platform told this correspondent.

De Mistura’s decision to follow Resolution 2254 and make the opposition delegation “inclusive”, a major shift, appears to be the result of pressure from Russia, now the chief external power on the Syrian scene, militarily and diplomatically.

The US and its partners, allied to the “old” opposition, dominated the Syrian “peace process” during the first three rounds, which failed.

Russia, the ally of the government, is firmly in charge now. This was made clear on Monday when the HNC spoke of Moscow adopting a more “neutral” line, although this is not true, and mentioned looking forward to consultations with Russian officials taking part in the Geneva talks.

Like de Mistura, Russia has called for a single opposition delegation that not only includes the Moscow and Cairo platforms, but also the Kurds and the Hmeimin group, an opposition group formed last year at Russia’s airbase in Syria.

While neither of the latter groups are likely to be included, Russia indicated to the HNC that its reign as sole representative of the Syrian opposition is over.

Since its intervention in the Syrian conflict at the end of September 2015, Russia has become the major external military power involved in the conflict.

Although Iran has become deeply committed to the Syrian government’s fight against anti-Assad insurgents and Al Qaeda offshoots, Tehran has played a secondary but determining role.

Russian’s primacy was recognised by Turkey, which co-sponsored the ceasefire on which the current round of negotiations is based.

Russian airpower and Iranian and Iraqi ground forces contributed to the Syrian army’s campaign to drive insurgents from eastern Aleppo and continue to engage anti-Damascus forces in the takfiri-held northwestern province of Idlib, and to bolster the army’s efforts to retake the desert town and ancient city of Palmyra from Daesh.

The Syrian government now controls the country’s five main cities — Damascus, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Aleppo — as well as territory in the south.

Strengthened militarily, Damascus has gained the advantage in negotiations, particularly since Russia is playing a major role.

Having funnelled takfiri fighters, weapons and funds into Syria, Ankara seemed to have switched sides when Daesh launched attacks in Turkey itself.

Ankara-backed “Free Syrian Army” units, bolstered by Turkish troops and tanks, captured from Daesh the strategic Syrian towns of Al Bab, Jarablus and Dabiq, but Turkey’s main aim is to contain the US-fostered Kurdish-dominated Democratic Forces, which have taken territory along the Syrian-Turkish border and are advancing on the Daesh capital at Raqqa.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan adopted an oust-Assad policy in 2011 and would like to see his removal, but seems to have recognised, belatedly, that Daesh and Al Qaeda pose major dangers to Turkey and must be given priority over the battle against Assad.

Erdogan is due to visit Moscow early this month.

Although US President Donald Trump repeatedly said it would be a good idea for the US to cooperate with Moscow and Damascus in the fight against Daesh, his administration has not yet adopted a clear policy line.

This is creating serious and potentially catastrophic uncertainty at a crucial time for war and peace making in Syria.

If Trump sticks to his initial line, the intra-Syrian negotiations could prosper and the violence could wind down.

But if Trump is persuaded by fellow Republicans and military men to accept the anti-government policy followed by his predecessor, the Geneva talks can be expected to fail, the war will likely continue, and Russia, Iran and Iraq could opt for the “military solution” by escalating the campaign against anti-government insurgents supported by the US, Europe, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, while seeking to contain Daesh and Al Qaeda.