The US awaits the Arab plan: Shifting responsibility for Gaza?

As US Secretary of State Marco Rubio concludes his Middle East tour and the informal meeting in Riyadh, attended by Gulf leaders alongside Jordan and Egypt, Washington now awaits the final version of the Arab plan, which is expected to be presented as an alternative to President Trump’s proposal.

In an interview following his return from the region, Secretary Rubio reaffirmed that Trump’s is the only plan currently on the table. However, he acknowledged Washington’s understanding of the Arab allies’ rejection of this plan and stated that the US is awaiting an alternative Arab initiative. Yet, despite expressing American willingness to support a new vision, the interview also revealed skepticism about the ability of Arab states to handle the issue of Hamas in Gaza and its future governance. 

While the US awaits an Arab proposal, signals from Washington suggest that tasking Arab states with formulating an alternative plan may, in effect, shift the burden of Gaza’s complex crisis onto them. This responsibility extends beyond the economic dimension of reconstruction or the political challenge of post-war governance to the critical security issue of dealing with Hamas. Secretary Rubio was explicit about this when he firmly rejected any role for Hamas in governing Gaza, questioning how the Arab proposal would address the issue. He stated bluntly: “Hamas cannot be the one ruling Gaza. How will you get rid of them? Because, ultimately, someone will have to step in and remove Hamas.”

Given these complexities, finding a realistic and practical solution that is acceptable to Washington remains a daunting challenge. This is particularly true given the strict conditions set by the US and Israel’s growing inclination toward military escalation, especially after recent hostage and body handovers, which have further reinforced the Israeli security establishment’s belief that combat must resume. Israeli officials argue that the war, which erupted following the October 7 events, carries significant psychological and symbolic dimensions that cannot be resolved through political agreements but require ongoing military operations to achieve their objectives.

Jordan, which has spearheaded efforts to shift the Gaza issue into the Arab diplomatic sphere, may soon find itself engaged in another round of diplomatic confrontation with the US administration if a viable solution for Gaza fails to emerge. At the same time, Amman is acutely aware of the risks associated with turning Gaza’s crisis into an Arab responsibility and the severe consequences of the region’s failure to present a swift and actionable plan. The worst-case scenario, a renewed war in Gaza, could provide Israel with the justification to impose forced displacement as an unavoidable reality for a significant segment of Gaza’s population.

Meanwhile, Jordan is also facing an unprecedented escalation in the West Bank, which could have direct demographic, geographic, and security implications for the Kingdom. This necessitates a proactive strategy to contain these developments and strengthen internal resilience. As a result, Jordan must prioritise its domestic front as a cornerstone of any future national strategy by restructuring internal governance, enhancing media and communication channels both domestically and internationally, and reinforcing state institutions. These measures are essential to confront potential challenges, especially in light of the possibility that the region’s political crises could spill over into Jordan.