Gaza, the West Bank, and the possibility of forced migration

The recent remarks by US President Donald Trump suggesting the displacement of Gaza's residents to Egypt and Jordan as a "practical solution" for Gaza's reconstruction carries significant risks. This proposal not only overlooks the fundamental complexities of the issue, from the acceptance of displacement by Gaza's residents to the logistical feasibility of relocating populations and securing the consent of all involved parties, but also reveals that forced displacement appears to be Trump's primary solution, one that the region may have to contend with for years to come.

It is essential to remember that we are observing Trump in the early phases of his political return. He is eager to present himself as a strong and decisive leader capable of imposing solutions, even if they appear coercive. However, as with many theoretical ideas that seem simple at first glance, the real challenge lies in their practical implementation.

We are living through an unprecedented era. The events following October 7 have fundamentally altered the region. Gaza is witnessing destruction on a scale it has never seen before. Amid this devastation, Israel appears to be betting on worsening the humanitarian crisis, hoping to make life in Gaza unbearable for its residents. This coincides with difficulties in finding realistic reconstruction solutions or even implementing humanitarian relief efforts that adequately respond to the scale of the disaster. 

Israel’s strategic vision is focused on achieving demographic displacement in Gaza and redrawing its geographic landscape. These goals might seem attainable if the crisis continues, and the humanitarian catastrophe deepens. What is alarming, however, is that proposing Jordan as an option in this context may implicitly lay the groundwork for considering it a destination for displaced Palestinians from the West Bank as well, should this theory of forced displacement extend beyond Gaza. 

Indeed, Israel is actively pursuing this scenario by seeking to reshape the geography of the West Bank through dismantling densely populated areas, such as the refugee camps in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm. This objective aligns with the vision of the Trump administration, which supports Israel's ambitions under the framework of "Judea and Samaria." Neither Egypt nor Jordan has had sufficient opportunity to directly engage with the US administration to present alternatives or explain the security, economic, and political risks associated with these proposals. 

Jordan's strategic response should focus on warning against these scenarios while presenting viable alternatives. Highlighting the potential shocks these steps could inflict on a key ally like the United States is crucial. Additionally, Jordan has several cards to play, particularly in the economic domain. These include regional energy projects, development initiatives, and the reconstruction of Syria. Such endeavours could offer the US tangible benefits across multiple fronts, forming the foundation for alternative approaches. 

In short, navigating Trump's looming flood of proposals requires a nuanced understanding of American perspectives and avoiding direct confrontation whenever possible. At the same time, Jordan must strengthen its position with robust Arab support. Elevating strategic relations with Saudi Arabia is particularly crucial, given its dominant role in the current and upcoming phases and its centrality to Trump's economic and political ambitions, including regional peace efforts. 

Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit to Washington may signal a new escalation in the region. The Gaza conflict remains unresolved, and tensions in the West Bank and Lebanon persist. If the conflict extends further to Iran, a broader escalation could stretch from Iraq to Iran, potentially resulting in the imposition of forced displacement as a grim humanitarian reality, especially if violence escalates once again in Gaza and intensifies in the West Bank.