From Gaza to Tehran: The complex road to stability

In the few remaining months of the current term, the Biden administration is striving to foster an atmosphere conducive to settlements in the Middle East in any possible way. Gaza, which has become the main issue that cannot be bypassed in any settlement proposal, is currently receiving significant efforts to draft an interim agreement that may lead to long-term solutions. However, while multiple positive signals appear on various fronts in the region, the reality on the ground remains fragile and susceptible to the risk of new fronts opening instead of closing existing conflicts.

Signs of paving the way for settlements have begun to appear clearly, perhaps most notably on the Iranian front. The rapid and sudden change in the presidency in Iran is likely to be influential in how Iran adapts to the current phase, and can perhaps be seen as an attempt to dispel any justifications for direct confrontation through political manoeuvring. 

This is reflected in the presidential election results and the arrival of the new "reformist" president of Azeri origin, Masoud Pezeshkian. The swift change in Iran's political scene, with the exit of hardliners such as former President Ebrahim Raisi, who was not only president, but also the strongest candidate to succeed the supreme leader, and his foreign minister who was preparing for major political roles, suggests that Iran is attempting to politically adapt to regional and international transformations.

Pezeshkian’s first message as President focused on extending a hand out to everyone "without exception" and the desire to resume nuclear agreement negotiations. This is a shift to create an Iran accepted by the West rather than being ostracised. This move aligns with fears of the return of president Trump and his Republican administration amidst an open regional confrontation and multiple active fronts. The next administration will likely not waste any opportunity to target Iran, forcing Iranians to mitigate the risk of a full-scale war and shut down any justifications for direct targeting of it. 

On the Lebanese front, diplomatic efforts are ongoing to prevent a war between Israel and Hizbollah. In this context of adaptation, it is notable that Hizbollah's recent messages varied from attempting to raise the threat level with the Israelis to linking all its current actions to Gaza, even delegating to Hamas to choose the appropriate arrangements to end the war, and thus accepting what Hamas accepts. This is a clear signal of Hizbollah's desire to close the Lebanese front. 

However, ending the war is not Hizbollah's decision to make. For the Israelis, the Lebanese front is the priority today, and closing it cannot be achieved by ending the Gaza front alone. For the Israelis, ending the threat from the Lebanese front requires an Israeli military intervention that establishes a new reality, primarily targeting Hizbollah's capabilities and infrastructure, establishing a buffer zone protected by international forces, and deepening internal crisis Hizbollah is facing through its relationship with other societal and political components. So, any solution that may emerge in Gaza does not necessarily contribute to finding a solution in Lebanon.

On the Gaza front, Hamas's political manoeuvring by talking about ending the fighting and managing Gaza post-war aims to maximise the chances of achieving a political settlement and preserving some gains. This is undoubtedly a move that has a regional dimension. Accepting these conditions in a previous stage could have exacerbated Netanyahu's crisis with the US administration and retained greater gains for the Palestinian side. Nonetheless, the current data suggests an attempt to prevent Israel from unilaterally shaping the confrontation strategy in the region by maximising the chances of achieving a political agreement under American auspices. The time factor and this administration's need to accomplish any agreement that can be built upon later from a stronger position.

However, the time factor is not as pressing for the Israelis, especially since the settlement climate has not matured amidst the open fronts and ongoing operations, from Syria to Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, Gaza and the West Bank. This means that attempting to dismantle the regional conflict scene through a deal in Gaza, despite its importance, still faces a significant threat of failure from the conflict parties themselves. The "lose-lose" equation may not appeal to anyone today to end the conflict in its current form. The differing visions and the reality of practical solutions may not enable closing these fronts feasibly without imposing decisive solutions.